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INTRODUCTION  
 
The Chief Federal District Judge in the Northern District of Texas 
signs a “Special Order” on March 13, 2020, effectively halting the judicial 
process in its tracks. “[A]ll grand jury proceedings between now and through 
May 1, 2020, are continued. All deadlines are suspended and tolled for all 
purposes, including the statute of limitations, from today through May 1, 
2020.”1 Shortly thereafter, the remaining federal district court judges for the 
three other federal districts in Texas hand down similar orders, all using 
similar language and each one citing data and reports from the Center for 
Disease Control (“CDC”).2 The CDC guidelines highlight the rapid spread of 
a novel viral influenza, known simply as the coronavirus.  
Thousands of miles away, the Chief Judge in the Northern District of 
Vermont is taking equally widespread precautions, and a “General Order” is 
signed into law on March 16, 2020. The order states in paragraph 1, “[a]ll 
civil and criminal matters scheduled for in-court appearance before any 
district or magistrate judge or bankruptcy judge in the District of Vermont 
are postponed pending further order of the court. This includes all jury 
trials.”3 Meanwhile, Donald J. Trump, the President of the United States, 
declares a state of emergency as information regarding the coronavirus begins 
to spread faster than the virus itself, which with over 1,600 confirmed cases 
in the U.S. since the first confirmed case just three months prior, is spreading 
rather rapidly.4  
Down in Florida, the state’s Supreme Court is trying to address the 
spread of coronavirus through its judicial system. Facing the difficult 
challenge of balancing the protection of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial 
versus the interest of justice, the Florida Supreme Court decides the latter is 
of more importance during this time, declaring “[a]ll time periods involving 
the speedy trial procedure, in criminal and juvenile court proceedings, are 
suspended from the close of business on Friday, March 13, 2020, until the 
close of business on Monday, March 30, 2020, or as provided by subsequent 
 
1 See Special Order No. 13-5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2020). 
2 See Special Order H-2020-6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2020) (same); General Order, No. 
20-03 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2020); Additional Order Regarding Grand Jury Proceedings 
Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by the Covid-10 Pandemic (W.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 
2020) [hereinafter “Texas District Court Orders”]. 
3 See General Order No. 85 (D. Vt. Mar. 16, 2020). 
4 Proclamation, White House, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency 
Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak (Mar. 13, 2020), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-
national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.  
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order.”5 Indeed, subsequent orders would follow.6 
In Texas federal courts, Florida state courts, and just about every other 
court in the United States, subsequent orders would continue to be drafted 
and signed into law as the coronavirus spread throughout the nation. In each 
one, judges would address the uphill battle facing the judicial system as 
dockets continued to pile up, motion hearings continued to be postponed, 
statutes of limitations continued to be tolled, and defendants continued to 
await their day in court. With each passing day, and with each subsequent 
order, watchful and observant litigators began to recognize worthy arguments 
that will surely find their way into courtrooms once they reinitiate their 
regular proceedings.  
Under what authority can courts toll statutes of limitations over a 
defendant’s objection? How will a defendant’s right to a speedy trial be 
affected by the nation’s sudden halt in judicial proceedings? With regards to 
jury trials, how will courts guarantee a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial 
panel without potentially exposing jurors, court employees, and others to the 
spread of the coronavirus? This comment seeks to answer some of those 
questions through an in-depth analysis of the legal system’s response to 
previous mass pandemics. Arguments are also drawn in from similarities 
between what is currently affecting the United States and previous instances 
when the nation was at war with foreign enemies or dealt with other natural 
disasters. As will become clear, the effects of the novel coronavirus have had 
a profound impact on the American judicial system. The nation may very 
well indeed be at war with an invisible enemy, combatting another natural 
disaster.  
 How courts respond to this pandemic will shape the future of the 
judicial system in the United States. Beyond subsequent orders, both general 
and special, federal and state courtrooms will determine how litigation is 
handled for the near future. Fortunately there is some precedent for these 
seemingly unprecedented times, and although history may not provide all the 
answers, a close inspection of some of this country’s past judicial stoppages 
is an informative starting point.  
 
 
 
5 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-13, Emergency 
Procedures in Florida State Courts (Fla. Mar. 13, 2020). 
6 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-23, 
Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida State Courts (Fla. Mar. 
18, 2020); See also Amendment 1 (Fla. May 4, 2020); Amendment 2 (Fla. May 21, 2020); 
Amendment 3 (Fla. June 8, 2020). 
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I.  BACKGROUND OF COURT CLOSURES  
 
Even the Supreme Court of the United States looked to the past when 
announcing its postponement of oral arguments due to the COVID-19 
outbreak. On the Court’s official website, a press release was published on 
March 16, 2020. The statement read “[t]he Court’s postponement of 
argument sessions in light of public health concerns is not unprecedented.  
The Court postponed scheduled arguments for October 1918 in response to 
the Spanish flu epidemic.  The Court also shortened its argument calendars 
in August 1793 and August 1798 in response to yellow fever outbreaks.”7 
However, though it may be reassuring to know this isn’t the Supreme Court’s 
first closure in response to a global pandemic, the Court’s press release does 
not instruct lower courts on how they should proceed. Rather, individual 
courts have been left to make their own decisions regarding closures, 
postponements, and tolling decisions. These decisions have attempted to 
balance the interests of parties who have waited days, months, sometimes 
years for their hearings, some of which are legally mandated, against the 
health of judges, clerks, courtroom deputies, staff, lawyers, jurors, and 
defendants all present within the courtroom. Many courts do not have the 
luxury of looking back to 1793 and their system’s reaction to yellow fever. 
Instead, some are learning on the fly how difficult it can be to handle such a 
roadblock in their docket. 
But mass pandemics are not the only source of guidance on this issue. 
Court closures are not new. In fact, many states have already enacted 
legislation specifically to address and mitigate a disaster's effects on the 
ability of litigants to file documents and proceed with their cases despite an 
inaccessible courtroom. For example, a California statute entitled 
“Government Code Section 68115” vests the Judicial Council's chair with 
wide-ranging powers to handle such mitigation.8 These powers might arise 
during war, insurrection, pestilence, public calamity, the destruction of a 
courthouse, or when mass arrests threaten orderly court operations.9 
This section covers some of those instances that led to court closures, 
including a look at the pandemic most frequently compared to the ongoing 
coronavirus outbreak, the Spanish flu outbreak in the early 20th century.  
 
A.  Previous Pandemics  
 
The CDC estimates that the Spanish flu epidemic took 675,000 lives 
 
7 Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 16, 2020), available at 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_03-16-20.  
8 Cal. Gov't Code §68115(a), (b). 
9 Id.  
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throughout the United States and 50 million worldwide.10 Approximately 
one-third of the entire global population was suspected of becoming infected 
with the virus, a strain of H1N1 with avian origin.11 In Washington D.C., 
where the Supreme Court had just issued their postponement of arguments at 
the start of its 1918-1919 term by about a month, more than 33,000 
Washington residents would fall ill between October 1, 1918 and February 1, 
1919. Of that number, roughly 2,895 would wind up dying from the disease 
according to the Influenza Encyclopedia of the University of Michigan 
Center for the History of Medicine.12 
As previously mentioned, the Court had dealt with mass pandemics 
just two decades before, when they declared similar postponements.13 Those 
decisions came back when the Supreme Court was responding to outbreaks 
of yellow fever, another severe virus believed to be transmitted mainly 
through mosquitos. In those prior instances, the Court was laying the 
foundation for what circumstances warranted stoppages of high-profile court 
proceedings. The Court was tasked with balancing the dangers of an outbreak 
in Philadelphia, then the nation’s capital, versus the interests of justice. 
“There being some appearances of the Yellow Fever in Waterstreet, between 
the Bridge and Walnut Street, the lawyers agreed to continue most of the 
Causes, and our Court broke up yesterday,” Justice James Iredell wrote on 
Aug. 8, 1798.14 “We have been adjourned on account of the epidemic as it 
was not thought right to require lawyers to come, often across the continent, 
to a crowded and infected spot,” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote.15 
Despite over 200 years in separation, the same concerns raised by 
Justice Holmes are the ones confronting litigators and law firms today. When 
asked to comment on the Supreme Court’s recent postponement of oral 
arguments, Michael W. McConnell, a Stanford University law professor and 
senior of counsel to Wilson Sonsini, who was to argue on March 25th in 
Carney v. Adams representing Delaware in defending its judicial selection 
system, had this to say - “I am in California, where my county has issued a 
 
10 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Immunization 
and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), 1918 Pandemic (H1N1 virus) (Mar. 20, 2019), 
available at https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-pandemic-h1n1.html.  
11 Id.  
12 District of Columbia Health Officer, Annual Report of the Commissioners of 
Columbia Year Ended June 30, 1919, Vol. III, Report of the Health Officer, 18 (1919), 
available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.1430flu.0014.341. (The mortality figure also 
includes 680 deaths due to pneumonia brought on by influenza). 
13 Mark Walsh, Outbreaks of Disease Have Shuttered the Supreme Court Going Back 
More Than 2 Centuries, ABA Journal (Mar. 19, 2020), available at 
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/outbreaks-have-shuttered-the-supreme-court-
going-back-more-than-two-centuries.  
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
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‘shelter-in-place’ order, . . . I can’t say I was looking forward to a trans-
continental plane ride in the midst of this virus.”16 
And in addition to the litigators traveling to the highest court in the 
land, the very justices who issue decisions themselves cannot be discounted 
either. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg turned 87 in March, while Justice 
Stephen G. Breyer is 81. Three other members of the court are also at an age 
considered to be at the highest risk of death from coronavirus: 65 or older. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel 
A. Alito Jr. all fall within this at-risk age group. With so much at stake for 
these justices, it’s no surprise that they would seek to take every precaution 
necessary to ensure the safety of everyone involved in oral arguments before 
the Supreme Court. Rather, what is more surprising is the extent of the 
extreme circumstances in which the Court has decided to postpone 
arguments. In general, very few instances have risen to this level of severity, 
and seldom have they led to total court closures.  
 
B.  Other Court-Closing Occurrences 
 
In 2005, a tropical storm formed over the southeastern part of the 
Bahamas. It gained intensity as it hovered over warm Atlantic waters, but 
actually weakened as it passed over the state of Florida as a Category 1 storm. 
Once reaching the Gulf of Mexico, however, Hurricane Katrina would 
quickly become the most powerful and devastating storm ever to hit the state 
of Louisiana. Twenty courthouses in southeastern Louisiana alone were 
damaged or rendered inoperable. Of those damaged buildings was that of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, which closed due to the mandatory evacuation of 
the city and the loss of basic services such as water and electricity.17 
Following the destruction, legal and administrative issues stemming from the 
lack of access to the courts and the mass displacement of the legal community 
stifled the progress of any judicial proceedings. In response to these issues, 
New Orleans native and Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Pascal 
F. Calogero, Jr., in conjunction with the six other associate justices, instituted 
a number of efforts to assist in the recovery of the legal system.18 
Among those efforts was ensuring the safety and welfare of judicial 
employees, as well as the planning for temporary court accommodations so 
that proceedings could begin as quickly as possible.19 Indeed, less than a 
 
16 Id. 
17 Greg G. Guidry, The Louisiana Judiciary: In the Wake of Destruction, 70 La. L. 
Rev. 1145, 1153 (2010), https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol70/iss4/5. 
18 Id. at 1155. 
19 Judicial Administrator’s Office, The Supreme Court of Louisiana, Justice at Work: 
The State of Judicial Performance in Louisiana 2005-2006, 9 (2006), available at 
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week after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the court had set up interim 
offices at the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal courthouse.20 Flexible 
leave policies were established to meet the needs of those unable to return to 
work, either because of destruction to their homes or the inability to navigate 
through flooded streets.21 
Other states quickly took notice of the steps Louisiana was taking to 
mitigate the harm caused by this natural disaster. Soon, other jurisdictions 
were issuing their own disaster relief plans, making it known that they would 
be prepared for any potential court closures. Meanwhile, litigators inspected 
those newly developed disaster plans, in addition to those already in place, 
looking for guidance should another natural disaster affect them. 
In California, for example, courts and lawyers needed to be prepared 
for any number of natural disasters that could affect deadlines – earthquakes, 
wildfires, and landslides to name a few – as well as the possibility of man-
made disruptions – power failures, terrorist attacks, and riots. California’s 
Government Code Section 68115 vests the power to gauge the impact of any 
of these occurrences in the state’s Judicial Council.22 Section B of that statute 
states “[u]pon a finding by the court that extreme or undue hardship would 
result unless the case is transferred for trial, a pending civil case may be 
transferred to any superior court in an adjacent county or to any superior court 
within 100 miles of the border of the county in which the court impacted by 
the emergency is situated.” 
The obvious difference between these solutions and any available to 
the current judicial system’s attempt to address the ongoing coronavirus 
pandemic is the overarching purpose for the court closures. In 2005, 
Louisiana had a shortage of amenities, as many of the state’s courthouses in 
the hardest hit areas had been destroyed by flooding and Katrina’s winds. 
There was, however, a majority of undamaged courthouses, as well as the 
possibility of establishing temporary offices. In the California statute, it is 
assumed that there exist courtrooms outside the area in which “the court 
impacted by the emergency is situated.” These are issues rooted in a lack of 
courtroom space. These disasters are easily traced. Now, however, there is no 
such shortage of courtrooms, and the disaster is much more difficult to track. 
Courtrooms across the United States are not damaged. They have not closed 
their doors because of flooding, fires, or landslides. Rather, it is the people 
who fill the courtrooms who carry the potential for imminent harm.  
 
 
https://www.lasc.org/press_room/annual_reports/reports/2005_06_jp. [hereinafter “Judicial 
Performance 2005-2006”]. 
20 Id. at 8. 
21 Id. at 7. 
22 Cal. Gov't Code §68115(a), (b). 
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C.  The Justice Systems Initial Response to this Pandemic 
 
The response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has been widespread, 
but it has not necessarily been uniform. Across the United States, federal 
districts and state judiciaries have formulated an extensive range of 
temporary solutions to address the inability to convene in a court room. 
Obviously, the discrepancies across state lines will soon become the topic of 
litigation in the upcoming months, but before delving into the future of 
litigation post-COVID-19, it’s important to highlight those discrepancies as 
they were enacted during the first few days, weeks, and months of the 
coronavirus outbreak. Therefore, what follows is a brief highlighting of 
notable orders regarding the pandemic from a range of jurisdictions both 
federal and state and covering matters both criminal and civil. 
  Beginning with the jurisdictions first mentioned in the introduction, the 
four federal districts in Texas each signed “general” or “specific” orders 
using similar language and purporting to toll the deadlines under the federal 
criminal statutes of limitations concerning matters pending before federal 
grand juries in view of the COVID-19 pandemic.23 Each of those four orders 
came between March 13, 2020 and March 17, 2020. 
In the Northern District of Vermont, that federal court used differing 
language but ultimately came to the same conclusion as the Texas federal 
courts. General Order No. 85 effectively postponed all civil and criminal 
matters pending further order from the court. Like the Texas federal court 
decisions, the Northern District of Vermont issued this order relatively close 
in time to the declaration of a state of emergency, which came on March 13, 
2020, and like the Texas federal court decisions, Vermont chose to toll 
statutes of limitations for the time-being. A little over a month later, however, 
the Northern District of Vermont would highlight how certain matters would 
be treated differently under the new rules. Specifically, General Order No. 
89, filed on April 28, 2020, would outline how the court would handle 
criminal cases differently than civil cases. Paragraph 4 under Section 1 states 
“[c]ourt-ordered deadlines in criminal cases will need to be revised in many 
cases. Counsel shall communicate and submit revised scheduling orders on a 
case-by-case basis as appropriate. Scheduling orders now in place remain in 
effect until further order of the court.”24 In contrast, the court was far more 
blunt about civil matters, ordering all civil trials to be postponed except as 
specifically scheduled by the court.25 
In referring back to the initial order, the Northern District of Vermont also 
addressed obvious concerns of criminal defendants wondering how their right 
 
23 Texas District Court Orders, supra notes 1 and 2. 
24 See General Order No. 89 (D. Vt. Apr. 28, 2020). 
25 Id.  
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to a speedy trial would be affected by the court’s order. The court stated in 
Paragraph 9 under Section 1, “[a]s previously ordered in ¶ 4 of General Order 
No. 85, the time period of the postponements implemented by this Order will 
be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, as the court specifically finds that 
the ends of justice served by ordering the postponements outweighs the best 
interests of the public and any defendant’s right to a speedy trial, pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).”26 Although this issue is discussed in further 
detail in the “Right to a Speedy Trial” section later on, it’s important to begin 
to think about the court’s reasoning and justification here. The same logic 
would be implemented by district courts across the nation, subjecting 
criminal defendants to extended periods of incarceration that might otherwise 
violate their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.  
For example, in the Northern District of Florida, the same “ends of 
justice” language was used by Chief District Judge Mark E. Walker in 
Administrative Order No. 349. In addition to all grand jury proceedings from 
April 1, 2020 to April 30, 2020 being cancelled, the Order held “[f]or the 
reasons stated above and those set forth in Administrative Order 345, which 
are incorporated herein, the Court finds that the ends-of-justice are served by 
suspending the 30-day statutory speedy trial time period set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(b), resetting the 30-day period to begin anew on the date this Court 
permits grand juries in the Northern District of Florida to resume meeting, 
and excluding the period of time between the date on which a Defendant is 
arrested and the date on which this Court first permits grand juries in the 
Northern District of Florida to resume meeting, for all Speedy Trial Act 
purposes.”27 Under what authority can this court simply suspend the 30-day 
statutory speedy trial time period set forth by Congress, and how can these 
decisions, which seem to have been handed down in federal jurisdictions 
across the nation, be contested? As mentioned, these questions are the subject 
of discussion later on in this comment.  
But aside from a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, the general orders 
being handed down by federal district courts have brought to light other 
obvious hurdles that the judicial system must face during this ongoing 
pandemic. Statutes of limitations, clearly, have been the subject of many of 
these orders, but so too have been one of the more basic fundamental pillars 
of the U.S. judicial system – jury trials.  
Switching from the federal system but remaining in the Sunshine State, 
an analysis of some of Florida’s Supreme Court orders paint a descriptive 
picture. On March 13, 2020, Florida Supreme Court Justice Charles T. 
Canady issued an Administrative Order (AOSC20-13) suspending all jury 
 
26 Id. 
27 See Administrative Order No. 349 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2020). 
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trials in Florida's court system for a two-week period.28 At the time, it seemed 
as if a two-week suspension would be all that was necessary to combat the 
pandemic. Clearly, that would soon prove to be inaccurate. On March 24, 
2020, Florida’s Supreme Court issued an additional Administrative Order 
(AOSC20-17), extending the suspension of all jury trials in Florida's court 
system through Friday, April 17, 2020.29 On April 6, 2020, a third 
Administrative Order (AOSC20-23) extending the suspension of all jury 
trials in Florida's court system through Friday, May 29, 2020 was handed 
down.30 Then on May 4, 2020, Justice Canady issued Amendment 1 to 
Administrative Order (AOSC20-23) expanding the list of court proceedings 
to be held remotely during the coronavirus pandemic, and extending the 
suspension of all jury trials in Florida's court system once again through 
Thursday, July 2, 2020. What litigators and their respective clients were 
seeing was the court’s inability to predict exactly when jury trials would be 
able to resume in their original form. Instead, many jurisdictions are now 
attempting to implement some modified jury processes to ensure some cases 
can continue.  
In Florida, that means “establish[ing] the framework and identify[ing] the 
logistics of trying cases remotely.”31 Subsequently, the state’s Supreme Court 
authorized a pilot program for remote jury trials, specifying that the program 
was limited to civil cases and would be authorized in only up to five of the 
state’s twenty judicial circuits.  
In California state courts, remote video technology is being used at least 
to some capacity in both civil and criminal cases, as demonstrated by the 
Superior Court of California in the County of Sacramento. On March 30, 
2020, that court issued its general Order entitled “Arraignments and 
Preliminary Hearings - Remote Video Technology,” providing that “all in-
custody arraignments and preliminary hearings shall be accomplished 
through the use of interactive video technology to minimize the physical 
proximity of all participants as specified therein.”32 Notably, that Order 
required the consent of the defendant to conduct the proceeding remotely and 
 
28 See supra note 5, Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-13, 
Emergency Procedures in Florida State Courts (Fla. Mar. 13, 2020). 
29 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-17, COVID-19 
Emergency Measures in the Florida State Courts (Fla. Mar. 24, 2020). 
30 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-23, 
Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida State Courts (Fla. Apr. 6, 
2020). 
31 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-31, Remote Civil 
Jury Trial Pilot Program (Fla. May 21, 2020). 
32 See Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, Order Arraignments and 
Preliminary Hearings - Remote Video Technology (Cal. Mar. 30, 2020). 
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in compliance with local emergency rules.33 As for civil cases, the court 
continues to use video conferencing for preliminary matters 
Meanwhile, in Massachusetts,  that state’s Supreme Court is allowing 
more flexibility and less judicial interference with regards to civil cases, 
where “due to the continuing challenges of conducting in-person depositions 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Judicial Court, pursuant to its 
superintendence and rule-making authority. . .” issued the following order: 
“[1] Any deposition taken in a civil case pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 30 and 
30A, and pursuant to Court Department rules and standing orders, may be 
conducted remotely (remote deposition), that is, in a manner that allows for 
the deponent, all other persons entitled to attend (e.g., the parties, counsel for 
the parties, counsel for the deponent), and all other necessary persons (e.g., 
the officer/court reporter) to participate without attending the deposition in 
person. [2] Neither a stipulation of the parties nor a court order is required to 
conduct a remote deposition.”34 
To dig through each state and federal court order and analyze the 
ramifications would take far more time than the orders themselves are 
effective for. Many of these rulings contain within them clear deadlines for 
when they should expire, or otherwise contain language that insists rules will 
change “pending further court order.” The above examples simply highlight 
some of the statutory and constitutional hurdles confronting the judicial 
system moving forward during the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic – 
mainly, issues regarding statutes of limitations, jury trials, and criminal 
speedy trials. With each judicial order handed down, a plethora of questions 
stem from the effects on litigants. In taking each topic and looking towards 
the authority these courts have to implement such rules, plaintiffs and 
defendants, prosecutors and defense attorneys, will learn what the future of 
litigation in the United States will look like in a post-COVID-19 world. Each 
topic deserves specific attention. Therefore, this comment begins with 
perhaps the most novel – statutes of limitations and their enforcement beyond 
a defendant’s objection in light of COVID-19.  
 
 
II. TOLLING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
 
In 2010, Justice Stephen Breyer issued the majority opinion for United 
States v. Comstock, in which the Supreme Court held, among other things, 
that Congress undoubtedly had the power to enact legislation altering the 
 
33 Id. 
34 See Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Orders, Supreme Judicial Court order 
regarding remote depositions (Mass. May 26, 2020). 
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federal criminal statutes of limitations.35 This power came from the U.S. 
Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, Breyer reasoned. “[T]he 
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal 
legislation.”36 Along with that authority came the power to create and define 
crimes. It followed, then, that Congress could define limitations periods with 
regards to those crimes. Indeed, Breyer noted in the Comstock opinion that 
“the Constitution, which nowhere speaks explicitly about the creation of 
federal crimes beyond those related to counterfeiting, [t]reason, or Piracies 
and Felonies committed on the high Seas or against the Law of Nations, 
nonetheless grants Congress broad authority to create such crimes.”37 Shortly 
thereafter, lower courts began to solidify that notion. In 2013, the United 
States District Court for the District of Nebraska held that “[j]ust as Congress 
[is] empowered to define the crime, including the statute of limitations, 
[Congress is also] empowered to provide for tolling of the statute of 
limitations.”38 
Clearly, there is precedent for criminal statutes of limitations to be 
postponed, extended, and tolled so long as Congress passes some sort of 
statute covering the issue. The problem facing U.S. court systems now, 
however, lies in the fact that criminal statutes of limitations have not been 
extended by any Congressional action at this point in time. Rather, most of 
the judicial system has taken it upon themselves to issue their own general 
and specific orders. From a separation of powers perspective, this means that 
as these limitations periods expire, the Government may lose the ability to 
prosecute individuals who’s alleged crime occurred near that limitations 
threshold.  
For civil cases, additional issues arise. Many court orders either specify 
that civil cases will fall in priority to criminal matters, or don’t specify how 
those matters will be handled at all. Civil litigants are keeping a watchful eye 
of new orders that are handed down, patiently awaiting their opportunity to 
file their lawsuit, yet fully aware that time is ticking and a backlogged docket 
does not favor their claim.  
How will litigators respond to these novel issues? A likely solution will 
be the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling. Another, at least for purposes of 
criminal litigation, may be the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act. An 
explanation of both is necessary in order to understand how each will be 
utilized in the courtroom over the upcoming months.  
 
 
35 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 135 [internal citations and quotations omitted]. 
38 United States v. Arrington, 2013 WL 5963140, at *7 (D. Neb. Nov. 7, 2013). 
Statutory and Constitutional Hurdles During the COVID-19 Pandemic 
 14 
A.  Issue  
 
The purpose of any criminal statute of limitations is to reflect “a 
legislative judgment that, after a certain time, no quantum of evidence is 
sufficient to convict.”39 In both criminal and civil contexts, statutes of 
limitations are meant to protect parties from having to defend themselves 
from the government or opposing parties “when the basic facts may have 
become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of 
official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.”40  
In the days after the declaration of a state of emergency, when courtrooms 
were announcing their closures for periods of roughly two weeks, it was not 
expected that statutes of limitations would soon become a ground for debate. 
However, as time has shown, the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic has 
prevented courts from reopening, or at least severely limited their capacity to 
move cases along. As days turned into weeks and weeks turned into months, 
it became clear that statutes of limitations, both criminal and civil, would 
need to be addressed by prosecutors and plaintiffs. When defendants proffer 
a statute of limitations defense, it is the burden of the opposing party to 
establish compliance, showing either that the cause of action occurred within 
the limitations period or that an exception to the limitations period exists.41 
 
B.  The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 
 
Generally, federal law provides that non-capital criminal offenses must 
be brought against defendants no later than five years after the alleged 
crime.42  Certain crimes may warrant extended limitations periods, such as 
ten years for bank fraud, as defined in 18 U.S. Code § 3293, or six years for 
securities fraud, covered in 18 U.S. Code § 3301. A number of circumstances, 
however, may warrant the extension of a limitations period under the general 
statute – offenses against children, certain terrorist offenses, fugitives from 
the law to name a few. Notably absent from that list, however, are public 
health crises.  
But one such circumstance is defined in 18 U.S. Code § 3287 and is 
commonly referred to by its abbreviated name, the “Suspension Act.” The 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act provides for a suspension of the 
statute of limitations for certain specified offenses “[w]hen the United States 
is at war or Congress has enacted a specific authorization for the use of the 
 
39 United States v. DeLia, 906 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stogner v. 
California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)). 
40 Id. (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970)). 
41 Musacchio v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 709, 718 (2016). 
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). 
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Armed Forces.” The statute only applies to criminal actions, and therefore it 
likely won’t be used by civil litigants in the near-future when attempting to 
rebut limitations defenses. That caveat stems from a Supreme Court decision 
in which Justice Samuel Alito issued an opinion holding that “[t]he 1921 and 
1942 versions of the [Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act] were enacted 
to address war-related fraud during, respectively, the First and Second World 
Wars. Both extended the statute of limitations for fraud offenses ‘now 
indictable under any existing statutes.’ Since only crimes are ‘indictable,’ 
these provisions quite clearly were limited to criminal charges.”43 
Further, the Suspension Act only tolls a set list of federal crimes, not all 
federal crimes. Though Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. 
Carter made the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act prospectively 
applicable to future wartime frauds rather than merely applicable to past 
frauds as earlier versions had held, the list of crimes covered under the 
Suspension Act remained finite. The current version of the Suspension Act 
reads as follows: 
 
When the United States is at war or Congress has enacted a specific 
authorization for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) 
of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)), the running of any 
statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or 
attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any 
manner, whether by conspiracy or not, or (2) committed in connection 
with the acquisition, care, handling, custody, control or disposition of any 
real or personal property of the United States, or (3) committed in 
connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance, 
payment for, interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or 
settlement, of any contract, subcontract, or purchase order which is 
connected with or related to the prosecution of the war or directly 
connected with or related to the authorized use of the Armed Forces, or 
with any disposition of termination inventory by any war contractor or 
Government agency, shall be suspended until 5 years after the termination 
of hostilities as proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation, with notice to 
Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of Congress. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3287. In reading the statute, it’s clear that Congress intended for 
the Suspension Act to be triggered under only one of two routes: (1) when 
the United States is at war or (2) when Congress has enacted a specific 
authorization for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) of 
the War Powers Resolution.  
 
43 Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States., ex rel. Carter, 135 S.Ct. 1970 
(2015). 
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The conditions are black and white, and it seems as if there is no way for 
the Government to successfully meet those requirements. Yet, during this 
time of unprecedented viral spread, it’s possible that prosecutors will need to 
argue that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is the best way of 
tolling statutes of limitations when the facts of the case even remotely line up 
with the crimes listed in the statute.   
The more likely option will be to argue the first triggering mechanism, 
that the “United States is at war.” Frankly, it seems unlikely at this point in 
time that Congress would enact any specific authorization for the use of 
Armed Forces to combat the spread of COVID-19. The most encompassing 
piece of legislation addressing the pandemic, the “Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security Act” or the “CARES Act,” makes no suggestion of 
the possibility of an armed combative response.44 The only other option 
warrants at least some discussion. 
Though not officially declared one by Congress, the COVID-19 
pandemic has certainly made many Americans feel like the United States is 
at war. Frontline medical workers have been referred to as warriors as they’ve 
battled the pandemic. The President of the United States even tweeted that 
the world was “at war with a hidden enemy.”45 Regardless, the President’s 
tweets and the frontline workers’ grit is not sufficient to trigger the 
Suspension Act. Rather, at least some federal courts have used a factors-test 
to determine whether or not the country was at war.46 In United States v. 
Prosperi, the District Court of Massachusetts listed the following four factors 
that a court should consider in deciding whether the United States is “at war” 
for purposes of the Act: (1) the extent of the authorization given by Congress 
to the President to act; (2) whether the conflict is deemed a “war” under 
accepted definitions of the term and the rules of international law; (3) the size 
and scope of the conflict including the cost of the related procurement effort; 
and (4) the diversion of resources that might have been expended on 
investigating frauds against the government. Other jurisdictions that have 
used this factors-test include the Southern District of Mississippi and the 
Western District of Texas.47 
Subjecting the spread of COVID-19 to the Prosperi factors leads to an 
inconclusive result, which at the very least, poses an interesting problem for 
 
44 See Public Law 116-136, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
(the CARES Act) (enacted March 27, 2020) [hereinafter “The CARES Act”] . 
45 Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter (Mar. 17, 2020, 3:31 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1239997820242923521.  
46 United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 449 (D. Mass. 2008). 
47 United States v. Pearson, 2010 WL 3120038, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 4, 2010). 
(holding that U.S. was “at war” for purposes of Suspension Act during military actions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan); United States v. Barrera, 2009 WL 10680035, at *7 (W.D. Tex. 
Nov. 9, 2009). 
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judges deciding on the issue. First, a court would examine the extent of the 
authorization given by Congress to the President to act. At this time, Congress 
has not authorized the President to use armed force, but the CARES Act does 
provide for some of the effects of the President’s declaration of a state of 
emergency. For example, Section 1109 authorizes the Department of the 
Treasury to establish criteria for insured depository institutions to participate 
in a small business interruption loans program to provide loans under section 
7(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(a)) until the date on which the 
national emergency declared by the President expires.48 Other sections of the 
act provide guidance on protected health information during the declared 
state of emergency and the authorization for the Secretary of Education to 
waive certain statutory or regulatory provisions during the same.49 Clearly, 
the extent of the authorization given by Congress to the President to act is, at 
the very least, traceable. Moving to the second factor, “[d]efinitions rather 
emphasize the element of armed conflict, whether among States or between 
States and insurrectionary forces.”50 By this standard, the pandemic likely 
falls short of meeting the threshold for being “at war.” However, the final two 
prongs of the Prosperi test may suffice to surpass that bar. The third factor, 
specifically, weighs in favor of the COVID-19 global health crises being 
deemed a war for purposes of the act. The size and scope of this conflict is 
like nothing the United States has faced in the last century. Surely, the death 
count paints a picture reminiscent of times of war in the United States. 
Finally, the diversion of resources that might have been expended on 
investigating frauds against the government is another factor weighing in 
favor of an “at war” determination. The federal government has made great 
expenditures in trying to combat the spread of COVID-19, including sending 
stimulus checks to Americans, purchasing large quantities of health and 
medical equipment, and putting more money into finding a long-term vaccine 
to stop any further spread. 
Yet, some courts have disagreed with the Prosperi analysis entirely, 
pointing specifically to the Supreme Court’s holding that “the [Suspension 
Act] should be ‘narrowly construed’ and ‘interpreted in favor of repose.’”51 
It makes far more sense that the term “at war” be interpreted as only those 
instances when Congress has officially declared so.52 Under this more rigid 
standard, the ongoing global health pandemic falls flatly short of triggering 
 
48 The Cares Act §1109(a) United States Treasury Program Management Authority 
supra note 44.  
49 Id. at §4223; Id. at §4511. 
50 Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 451 supra note 46.  
51 Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 135 S.Ct. at 1978 (2015) supra note 43 (quoting 
Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953)). 
52 United States v. Western Titanium, Inc., 2010 WL 2650224, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 
2010). 
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the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act. In jurisdictions that follow this 
standard as opposed to the Prosperi test, what other methods might 
prosecutors use to effectively toll a statute of limitations over a defendant’s 
objection? One potential answer has to do with equitable tolling.  
 
C.  The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling 
 
Equitable tolling is a common law principle based on the idea that certain 
extraordinary circumstances warrant the pausing or temporary suspension of 
the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]enerally, a 
litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two 
elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.53 Importantly, Justice Alito held 
in Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States that these 
conditions were “elements”, not merely factors that the court considered.54 
This doctrine may seem like a useful tool for prosecutors seeking to bring 
charges against criminal defendants during the ongoing pandemic. One 
would hope that most U.S. Attorneys were diligently pursuing their cases, 
and it is hard to doubt that the wide array of court closures stand in their way. 
However, for most of its history, the doctrine of equitable tolling has mainly 
been used in civil litigation. Therefore, an analysis of the civil statutes at play 
are most relevant.  
For civil cases, time limitations on the commencement of actions arising 
under Acts of Congress are established by 28 U.S. Code § 1658, which states 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of 
Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be 
commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.55 As for state 
judicial systems, the statutes of limitations on filing civil actions vary by 
jurisdiction and by the cause of action. For example, California’s statute of 
limitations is generally governed by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 312, which 
requires litigants file their lawsuit within four years for written contract 
disputes, three years for property damage, and two years for personal injury. 
Contrast these statutes of limitations with those in Florida, where Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 95.011 governs and requires litigants to file their lawsuits within five 
years of written contract disputes, four years for property damage, and four 
years for personal injury.  
This isn’t to say that civil litigation will be only recipient of equitable 
tolling arguments. However, courts lack uniformity on whether the doctrine 
can or should be applied in criminal cases. At least some jurisdictions have 
 
53 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 
54 Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 750, 756 (2016). 
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1658. 
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debated the issue. Although it is most typically applied in civil actions, “there 
is no reason to distinguish between the rights protected by criminal and civil 
statutes of limitations,” held the United States Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals.56 That court would even double down on that holding, later 
reaffirming that “we have never foreclosed the possibility that equitable 
tolling applies to criminal statutes of limitations.”57 But, prosecutors should 
not jump on the bandwagon too eagerly. In United States v. Atiyeh, the Third 
Circuit specified that the doctrine should only be invoked “sparingly,” and 
that only under very narrow circumstances would it consider the argument.58  
So what is considered the proper “extraordinary” circumstances to invoke 
the doctrine of equitable tolling, and does the COVID-19 global pandemic 
meet those standards? Referring back to Menominee Indian Tribe of 
Wisconsin, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held, 
and the Supreme Court affirmed, that finding extraordinary circumstances 
required “a litigant seeking tolling to show an ‘external obstacl[e]’ to timely 
filing, i.e., that ‘the circumstances that caused a litigant's delay must have 
been beyond its control.’”59 But that alone isn’t the only consideration. The 
Supreme Court has also held that “[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling, as 
applied to federal statutes of limitations, extends an otherwise discrete 
limitations period set by Congress. Thus, whether tolling is available is 
fundamentally a question of statutory intent.”60 Put into clearer terms, the 
statutes of limitations drafted by Congress are presumed to be subject to 
equitable tolling, unless such equitable tolling would be inconsistent with the 
statutory text.61 Taken together, the availability of equitable tolling depends 
on the statute of limitation imposed by Congress and the extraordinary 
circumstances that prevent a diligent litigant from pursuing the proper course 
of action.  
But there are even more considerations that will complicate matters 
further as litigators attempt to navigate this unchartered territory. As far as 
state judicial systems go, whether a federal court sitting in diversity would 
consider tolling orders controlling substantive state law in the absence of 
binding state case law is up in the air. As has been shown above, many state 
courts differ in their handling of court closures – some tolling statutes of 
limitations and others leaving them untouched. In this regard, equitable 
tolling may be applied and misapplied across various jurisdictions. This of 
course assumes that the pandemic even satisfies the “extraordinary 
 
56 United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1998). 
57 United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 367 (3d Cir. 2005). 
58 Id.  
59 Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 750, 756 (2016). 
60 Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014). 
61 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002).  
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circumstances” required to invoke the doctrine. 
However the alternative seems equally if not more likely. There has not 
been any clear indication that the spread of COVID-19 will be a circumstance 
sufficient to allow litigants to win their equitable tolling argument. In the past, 
the Supreme Court has held that “[p]rocedural requirements established by 
Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by 
courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.”62 It’s unclear whether 
the Supreme Court would hold the same for state orders preventing access to 
federal or state courts, considering the doctrine of equitable tolling is 
supposed to applied “sparingly.”63 
For some context, it helps to look at some instances when equitable 
tolling was deemed acceptable given the “extraordinary circumstances.”  
Hanger v. Abbot saw the Supreme Court approve of equitable tolling in the 
midst the Civil War “during which the courts in Arkansas were closed on 
account of the rebellion.”64 Osbourne v. United States held that equitable 
tolling applied when a  plaintiff was unable to assert their rights while he was 
held as a prisoner in Japan during World War II.65 In a callback to Louisiana 
courts dealing with rain damage, Murray v. Cain, though not related to 
Hurricane Katrina, allowed equitable tolling to be applied when a  Louisiana 
State Penitentiary was under a state of emergency due to flooding, causing 
the petitioner to be evacuated from the prison and delaying his filing.66  
Whether the spread of COVID-19 rises to the level of “extraordinary 
circumstances” displayed in the above examples will likely be the result of 
skilled litigation. If prosecutors and plaintiffs are faced with a defendant’s 
statute of limitation defense, it will be upon them to show the hardships they 
faced at no fault of their own during the court closures caused by this global 
pandemic.  
 
 
III. RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
 
In the United States, all criminal defendants are ensured the right to a 
speedy trial. This right may arise by statute, through a state’s constitution, or  
under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The federal Speedy 
Trial Act was enacted to help establish some guidelines to determine when a 
violation of that right to a speedy trial occurred. These guidelines often placed 
a time limit on when the prosecution had to bring a defendant to trial after 
 
62 Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984). 
63  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). 
64 Hanger v. Abbot, 73 U.S. 532 (1867). 
65 Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947). 
66 Murray v. Cain, 2019 WL 1417442, at *3-4 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2019). 
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they had been arraigned or indicted. In the individual states, further 
guidelines were established. In some, the guidelines were clear, allowing the 
prosecution a specified number of days before a violation could be brought 
to the court’s attention. In others, the guidelines were less clear, allowing the 
court more flexibility in determining violations. Regardless, a state may offer 
a defendant greater speedy trial rights than are required by the U.S. 
Constitution, but may not reduce those rights. If shown, a violation of the 
Speedy Trial Act meant a defendant could have their charges dismissed had 
the case not yet reached trial, and if it had, the conviction and sentence wiped 
out.  
The justification for the Speedy Trial Act is obvious – a defendant should 
not be forced to face unreasonable lengths of confinement before he or she 
has had the chance to defend their innocence. Often defendants are held in 
custody after being denied bail or being unable to pay the amount set. In these 
cases, the right to a speedy trial ensures those innocent until proven guilty do 
not spend months under incarceration. 
An additional justification stems from the quality of evidence over the 
passage of time and the defendants right to present that evidence at trial. The 
Speedy Trial Act guarantees a defendant the ability to gather and present 
evidence while it is still relatively fresh. Witnesses may struggle to recall 
important details about a case, harms committed years in the past may lose 
their sting, and punishment for those harms may seem unjust if lengthy 
amounts of time have already passed.  
Despite the justifications for the right to a speedy trial, criminal 
defendants still have the ability to waive this right. Should a defendant choose 
to bring a claim on the grounds that their speedy trial right was violated, 
courts often look to whether that defendant raised the proper objection at an 
earlier time. This failure to raise the issue can also be viewed in conjunction 
with any benefit that the defendant received as a result of the delay. Viewed 
in totality, a court may find sufficient reason to deny a defendant’s claim that 
their right to a speedy trial was violated.  
Whether the COVID-19 pandemic rises to that level will undoubtedly be 
the subject of litigation in the coming months. On the federal level, the 
coronavirus outbreak has forced courts to reschedule, or outright cancel, 
everything form grand jury hearings to arraignments and indictments. 
Motions hearings, trials, and sentencing have all likewise been pushed further 
and further back on dockets throughout the federal system. As state judicial 
systems continue to hand down similar, yet more jurisdictionally specific 
orders, the backlog of criminal cases continues to grow and the clock on each 
defendant’s speedy trial countdown continues to tick.  
To better understand the problems facing speedy trial rights moving 
forward through this pandemic, an analysis of the validity of those federal 
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and state court orders is helpful. The following section takes a look at some 
of those new rules implemented in the judicial system and determines 
whether they will be the subject of future debate in courtrooms once they 
reopen.  
 
A.  Issue 
 
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have forced state and federal 
courts to balance public interest and safety against the rights of criminal 
defendants to a speedy trial. The need for social-distancing in response to the 
pandemic has made it difficult, if not impossible, for courtrooms to operate 
on schedule. That, in turn, has made compliance with the Speedy Trial Act a 
new hurdle for the government in criminal cases.  
The blanket orders that federal and state courts have enacted which 
effectively toll the right to a speedy trial have been applied generally and not 
on a case-by-case basis. Without looking at the factors of each defendant’s 
case, numerous objections can be raised questioning the validity of these 
orders. The U.S. Constitution, along with previous Supreme Court decisions, 
establish a number of factors that must be considered when denying a 
defendant’s speedy trial rights. Simply asserting that the court closures serve 
the ends of justice, without more, will cause an up-rise in speedy trial 
challenges, leading to the dismissal of more charges and wiping out more 
convictions and sentences.  
 
B.  The Speedy Trial Act 
 
As previously mentioned, the Speedy Trial Act establishes maximum 
time periods for the different stages of a federal criminal prosecution.67 The 
time period between an arrest and indictment cannot exceed thirty days.68 The 
time period between arraignment and trial cannot exceed seventy days.69 
Failure to comply with either of those time limits necessarily results in a 
dismissal of all charges, either with or without prejudice.70 There are, 
however, a number of permissible extensions for each of those time periods 
under certain circumstances. Some of those permissible extensions are 
relevant in addressing speedy trials during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Under Section 3161(b), if a grand jury was not convened in the district 
during the original 30-day period, then “the period of time for filing of the 
indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days.” A number of federal 
 
67 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. 
68 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). 
69 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). 
70 18 U.S.C. § 3162. 
Statutory and Constitutional Hurdles During the COVID-19 Pandemic 
 23 
districts have used this portion of the statute to grant extensions. The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Vermont, previously discussed in this 
comment, was one such jurisdiction.71 Another was the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Maine, which cited Section 3161(b), just one day after 
Vermont did, when announcing that "[d]ue to the unavailability of a grand 
jury in this District in May 2020, the 30-day time period for filing an 
indictment is tolled as to each defendant until this General Order 
terminates."72 The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah’s order used 
similar language as well.73 
But a problem arises with the use of Section 3161(b), as many states – 
Vermont, Maine, and Utah for example – have realized. That section provides 
for only a thirty day extension, and many jurisdictions soon acknowledged 
that these court closures were doomed to last longer than the statute provided 
relief for. With grand juries being suspended for more than the thirty day 
extension, courts needed another justification for their closures. Vermont’s 
General Order 89 provided that alternate justification for the tolling of speedy 
trials, stating “[a]s previously ordered in ¶ 4 of General Order No. 85, the 
time period of the postponements implemented by this Order will be excluded 
under the Speedy Trial Act, as the court specifically finds that the ends of 
justice served by ordering the postponements outweighs the best interests of 
the public and any defendant’s right to a speedy trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(h)(7)(A).”74 
Section 3161(h)(7)(A) has been the provision of the Speedy Trial Act that 
the majority of federal jurisdictions have fallen back on, at least for extending 
the time period between arrest and indictment. One explanation for why this 
section has proven more useful is simple – in at least some jurisdictions, the 
delay has no set deadline. Section 3161(h)(7)(A) covers “[a]ny period of 
delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion 
or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the 
attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the 
basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action 
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 
Circuits have split on how to determine a limit to the length of any such 
extension. For example, the Third Circuit held that "open-ended continuances 
to serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in 
length.”75 At least the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have entirely endorsed the 
 
71 See General Order No. 89 (D. Vt. Apr. 28 2020) supra note 24. 
72 See General Order 2020-05 (D. Me. Apr. 29 2020). 
73 See General Order 20-012  (D. Utah Apr. 28 2020). 
74 See supra note 24, 72. 
75 United States v. Lattany, 982 F2d 866 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Third Circuit’s reasoning as well.76 Contrast this with the Ninth Circuit, 
which has a more rigid analysis of the “ends of justice” extension in its 
application of the “Definite Duration” approach.77 This test, adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Pollack, requires an "ends of justice" 
continuance to be limited in duration, whether through the specification of a 
set number of days or a fixed end date.78 
Despite the location, however, federal courts from all across the nation 
have used the “ends of justice” provision to continue to push back court 
openings and further toll defendants’ right to a speedy trial. Take for example 
the Western District of Washington, where pursuant to Section 
3161(h)(7)(A), Chief United States District Judge Ricardo S. Martinez found 
that “the ends of justice served by ordering the continuance outweigh the best 
interests of the public and any defendant’s right to a speedy trial.”79 The U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of Illinois similarly looked towards 
Section 3161(h)(7)(A) “given the need to protect the health and safety of 
defendants, their counsel, prosecutors, court staff, and the public by reducing 
the number of in-person hearings to the fullest extent possible.”80 In the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the court declared pursuant 
to Section 3161(h)(7)(A) that "the ever-expanding risk of exposure to 
COVID-19 … causes it to be practically impossible to seat a jury and/or 
obtain a quorum of grand jurors while maintaining compliance with the 
current public health and safety recommendations from the [Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention] and the President."81 
Yet, despite this sample of federal courts using the “ends of justice” 
justification, few seem to go into further detail about how they’ve weighed 
the defendant’s right to their speedy trial, as required by Section 
3161(h)(7)(A).82 Rather, the “ends of justice” approach has mainly been used 
to effectively declare all defendants equal in their assertion of speedy trial 
rights. The problem with that, of course, is that no two cases are the same. 
District court orders wiping all defendants’ claims under one general 
 
76 See Greg Ostfeld, Comment, Speedy Justice and Timeless Delays: The Validity of 
Open-Ended "Ends of Justice" Continuances Under the Speedy Trial Act, 64 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1037, 1042-52 (Summer 1997). 
77 Id. at 1042. 
78 United States v. Pollack, 726 F2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1984). 
79 United States v. Hughes, 2020 WL 1331027, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2020).  
80 See Second Amended General Order No. 20-01, (C.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2020). 
81 See General Order No. 2020-06, (E.D. Va. March 23, 2020); see also General Order 
No. 2020-12, (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2020) ") (citing reasons set forth in Order No. 2020-06 to 
exclude time between May 2, 2020 and June 10, 2020 under Speedy Trial Act). 
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umbrella means that those cases that could have been pursued but were 
unnecessarily delayed along with all other matters would be subject to 
challenge.  
And still, some courts are finding even other ways to toll speedy trials. 
Under Section 3174, federal courts have one more justification for the 
temporary suspension or further delaying of a defendant’s demand for a 
speedy trial. Primarily, Section 3174(e) states that “[i]f the chief judge of the 
district court concludes that the need for suspension of time limits in such 
district under this section is of great urgency, he may order the limits 
suspended for a period not to exceed thirty days. Within ten days of entry of 
such order, the chief judge shall apply to the judicial council of the circuit for 
a suspension pursuant to subsection (a).”83 By taking this route, district court 
judges face the same thirty-day restriction they face under Section 3161(b), 
however 3174(e) allows them to then apply to the judicial council of the 
circuit court for approval, where the judicial council may then agree to 
declare a judicial emergency based on "calendar congestion resulting from a 
lack of resources."84 If "no remedy for such congestion is reasonably 
available," it may suspend the seventy-day time limit between arraignment 
and trial for the length of the judicial emergency, or up to one year, although 
trials must commence within 180 days of the indictment.85 
Chief Judge Kimberly J. Mueller from the Eastern District of California 
did exactly that on April 8, 2020, when she signed the Eastern District of 
California’s Request for Suspension of Speedy Trial Act Deadlines.86 The 
request itself was a seven-page letter describing the District’s struggle in 
complying with Speedy Trial Act guidelines. “The COVID-19 pandemic has 
exacerbated our pre-existing emergency such that there simply are no other 
options for alleviating our calendar congestion, despite the many steps we 
have been taking to manage the current crisis since its onset,” the letter says.87 
Both the Southern and Central Districts of California submitted similar 
requests to the Ninth Circuit’s judicial council.88 Subsequently, the Ninth 
Circuit approved of all three District Courts’ requests, citing various ways in 
which COVID-19 worsened already strenuous conditions in California 
federal courts.  
What’s interesting about each approval is that the Ninth Circuit does not 
 
83 See 18 U.S.C. §3174(e).  
84 See 18 U.S.C. §3174(a). 
85 See 18 U.S.C. §3174(b). 
86 See In re Approval of the Judicial Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of 
California, Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit, (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2020).  
87 Id.  
88 See Order of the Chief Judge No. 18, (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020); In re Approval of 
the Judicial Emergency Declared in the Central District of California, Judicial Council of 
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attempt to define what constitutes an emergency. In fact, the Council 
highlights that the Speedy Trial Act itself does not clarify it either: “[t]he 
statute does not specify what qualifies as an emergency or what factors to 
assess before determining that there is ‘no reasonably available remedy.’ In 
the legislative history of the [Speedy Trial Act], many members of Congress 
commented on the importance of a court’s resources to be able to comply 
with the Act’s time limits, and the ability to suspend time limits if a court 
could not meet those requirements.”89 
Whether courts should consider Congressional intent when reading into 
the Speedy Trial Act’s application to the COVID-19 pandemic will surely be 
a litigated issue moving forward. The focus of the statute is based on a lack 
of resources available for court procedures to continue. COVID-19 does not 
pose any sort of court congestion problem, at least not while courtrooms 
remain closed. Rather, courthouses possess all the resources they had in the 
past, only now those resources are being directed elsewhere. In the next 
section, more on that shift in resources will be discussed in detail. For now, 
however, there are other important considerations that need to be addressed 
with regard to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. 
 
C.  Additional Concerns 
 
1. COVID-19 within Jail and Prison Facilities  
 
Perhaps the segment of the U.S. population most at-risk for contracting 
COVID-19 is jail and prison inmates and detainees. Correctional and 
detention facilities are unique in the challenges they face when trying to 
combat infectious diseases. Those who spend time in these facilities, both 
inmates and employees, share confined environments for long periods of 
time, and buildings are often overcrowded. Combine this with the constant 
turnover of employees clocking in and out and the steady flow of new inmates 
entering the confines of the facility, and it becomes easy to see how rapidly 
a virus such as COVID-19 can spread.  
The numbers highlight just how serious the problem can be within 
correctional facilities. From April 22, 2020 until April 28, 2020, the CDC 
collected aggregate data from thirty-seven state and territorial health 
department jurisdictions analyzing the severity of the outbreak. “Thirty-two 
(86%) jurisdictions reported at least one laboratory-confirmed case from a 
total of 420 correctional and detention facilities. Among these facilities, 
COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,893 incarcerated or detained persons and 
 
89 See Judicial Council Approval of Southern District Emergency Declaration; Judicial 
Council Approval of Central District Emergency Declaration ; Judicial Council Approval 
of Eastern District Emergency Declaration. 
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2,778 facility staff members, resulting in 88 deaths in incarcerated or detained 
persons and 15 deaths among staff members.”90 These numbers, collected 
over the course of only six days, show the staggering amount of risk detainees 
face while still awaiting their day in court. Though the CDC recommends 
“[p]rompt identification of COVID-19 cases and consistent application of 
prevention measures, such as symptom screening and quarantine. . .” to 
protect incarcerated and detained persons and staff members, the simple fact 
is that it’s nearly impossible to screen each and every individual who enters 
a facility for the virus. “[C]rowded dormitories, shared lavatories, limited 
medical and isolation resources, daily entry and exit of staff members and 
visitors, continual introduction of newly incarcerated or detained persons, 
and transport of incarcerated or detained persons in multiperson vehicles for 
court-related, medical, or security reasons” all contribute to the rapid spread 
of COVID-19 within jails and prisons.91  
But besides following CDC guidelines to the best of their ability, how 
else are federal and state courts and correctional facilities monitoring and 
handling the safety of their prison populations? In New York, some federal 
judges are ordering the Wardens of local correctional facilities to provide, in 
writing, “a status report concerning the incidence of infection of COVID-19 
at each facility and the measures undertaken to mitigate the spread of 
COVID-19 within each facility. . .”92 This order was handed down in 
response to three defendants filing and continuing to file applications for 
release on the basis that their continued confinement, combined with 
additional information particular to each defendant’s case, subjected them to 
the risk of contracting the virus.  
In United States v. Martin, more federal courts are seen taking similar 
steps.93 In Maryland, the Martin court found it was necessary to lay some 
context before addressing the legal matters at issue, stating “[b]efore 
addressing the arguments of the parties and the evidence . . ., it is important 
to recognize the unprecedented magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic.”94 At 
issue was whether a drug conspiracy defendant, who suffered from asthma, 
high blood pressure, and diabetes, and was thus particularly at risk if he 
contracted coronavirus, should have had the decision to detain him without 
bail reversed. The Government argued that state correction officials at 
Chesapeake Detention Facility had established comprehensive health 
 
90 Megan Wallace et al., COVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities — United 
States, February–April 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) (May 15, 
2020) available at http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6919e1.  
91 Id.  
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measures to avoid a COVID-19 outbreak. Ultimately, the district court agreed 
with the Government’s assertions that Martin was a danger to the community, 
and that his interests in avoiding the risk of contracting coronavirus were 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of detention.95  
Despite the decision to keep Martin in detention, however, the Maryland 
court made great efforts to highlight the unprecedented nature of the COVID-
19 pandemic. The court stated “[w]hile correctional officials at [Chesapeake 
Detention Facility] and other facilities in Maryland may successfully have 
dealt with past viruses and outbreaks of communicable diseases, they pale in 
scope with the magnitude and speed of transmission of COVID-19.”96 
Additionally, the court made clear that Due Process, along with the Fourth 
and Fifteenth Amendments, may be implicated if defendants awaiting trial 
could demonstrate that they were being subjected to conditions of 
confinement that could subject them to exposure to serious illness. This 
would apply to both state and federal detainees, but might realistically only 
benefit those defendants that were elderly or suffered from more serious 
illnesses and conditions.97  
What has been made clear throughout the pandemic is that temporary 
release for defendants will not be given “based solely on generalized COVID-
19 fears and speculation.98 Instead, some federal courts are looking to a 
factors test, established in United States v. Clark to determine whether 
defendants should be entitled to temporary release. “In making this 
determination, factors the district court may consider include “(1) the original 
grounds for the defendant’s pretrial detention, (2) the specificity of the 
defendant’s stated COVID-19 concerns, (3) the extent to which the proposed 
release plan is tailored to mitigate or exacerbate other COVID-19 risks to the 
defendant, and (4) the likelihood that the defendant’s proposed release would 
increase COVID-19 risks to others.”99 Courts are not required to weigh each 
factor equally, however, so whether relief is granted is essentially left entirely 
up to the discretion of the district court.  
At this time, there are no definitive indications of how federal courts are 
determining which criminal detainees deserve temporary release. The issue 
 
95 Id. at *4. 
96 Id. at *2.  
97 Id.; See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (“In evaluating the 
constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the 
protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the 
proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. For under 
the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in 
accordance with due process of law”). 
98 United States v. Clark, 2020 WL 1446895 (D. Kan. 2020).  
99 United States v. Davis, 2020 WL 1951652 (N.D. Ind. 2020) (quoting United States 
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varies in complexity when looking at state judicial and correctional systems. 
For example, the Judicial Council of California voted 17-2 to “rescind, 
effective June 20, the COVID-19 temporary bail schedule that set 
presumptive bail at $0 for people accused of lower-level crimes,” a measure 
the state had initially taken to curb the spread of COVID-19 in jails and 
surrounding communities.100 In contrast, New York’s Governor Andrew 
Cuomo ordered the release of certain “eligible” inmates from state and local 
facilities.101 In this more virus-combative method, over one-thousand parole 
violators were subsequently released after they were deemed incarcerated for 
“non-serious offenses.”102 Across the fifty states and other U.S. territories, 
different strategies are being used to effectively prevent the spread of 
COVID-19 in jails and prisons.  
But generally speaking, the tests which have been developed in the past 
few months point towards the use of the Due Process Clause and the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments for federal and state detainees, respectively. 
Certainly, arguments made on behalf of the elderly and medically vulnerable 
will prove to be more effective than those made for younger and healthier 
defendants. The systems currently in play may favor those who need it most, 
but it’s impossible to ignore the inequities of their application. During this 
pandemic, however, inequities seem unavoidable. As Judge Kimberly J. 
Mueller wrote, “[a]s we are adjusting to work in new and imperfect physical 
circumstances, we are beginning to see a rising stream of new motions and 
petitions seeking immediate release from confinement in light of COVID-19, 
for which no established law guides the resolution and there often are no easy 
answers, particularly given the equitable considerations implicated.”103 
 
2. The Effects of Backlogging on Criminal versus Civil Litigation 
 
Because the right to a speedy trial is reserved strictly for criminal matters 
pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, the COVID-19 pandemic has already and will continue to force 
civil matters further back in court dockets across the nation. The American 
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Bar Association has already begun to inform litigators of this imminent 
backlog, stating “[m]easures taken to address the dangers of the coronavirus 
are expected to exacerbate the significant backlog of cases in state and federal 
courts, not to mention immigration courts that have a backlog of more than 1 
million cases.”104  
Once restrictions are lifted, court dockets will be forced to handle 
criminal matters that are nearing deadlines – either through statutes of 
limitations or demands for speedy trials. Defendants that are currently 
incarcerated will likely take priority, as jails and prisons will need to free up 
space and limit the number of potential COVID-19 carriers and spreaders. 
White-collar matters are likely to be considered last on the list of priorities, 
and so it can be expected that litigators will push for plea bargains to assist 
in lightening the backlog of cases. As one California District Court noted, 
“[b]y now it almost goes without saying that we should not be adding to the 
prison population during the COVID-19 pandemic if it can be avoided.”105 In 
this regard, white-collar criminal defendants may take comfort in knowing 
that home confinement appears to be the more appropriate solution, while 
white-collar civil defendants may understand that it could be years before 
they’re ever forced to show up in court.  
Regardless, courts will need to implement new methods of hearing cases 
moving forward to combat the extreme backlog of both criminal and civil 
cases that were halted by sudden closures and a nationwide shutdown. The 
American judicial system will be forced to welcome in a new age of digital 
and remote courtroom proceedings, which will undoubtably come with 
technical glitches and errors, as well as a plethora of new issues to be 
litigated. More on these issues is discussed below.  
 
 
IV. RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
 
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental pillar of the American judicial 
system. The Sixth Amendment outlines the rights to a speedy, impartial, jury 
trial in criminal cases and the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury 
trials in civil cases. In the individual states, most jurisdictions have codified 
the right to a jury either in their individual constitutions or in statutes passed 
by their legislatures. For example, in Colorado, the state’s constitution 
provides “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases” 
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under Article II, Section 23.106 In civil actions, the right to a jury trial is 
derived from the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure’s Rule 38 “in actions 
wherein a trial by jury is provided by constitution or by statute.”107 Similarly, 
Indiana’s constitution provides for the right to a jury in civil actions in its 
constitution, stating in Article I, Section 20 “[i]n all civil cases, the right of 
trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”108 
States throughout the nation codify and recognize the significance of jury 
trials. They remain a powerful tool for criminal defendants, civil litigators, 
and every entity in between, allowing issues of fact to be decided not by the 
judges who hear arguments every day, but rather by their peers who, at least 
in theory, can more closely relate to the matters at hand. Historically, only 
one issue has been determinative for whether a jury trial is available to civil 
litigants – distinctions between cases at common law or suits in equity.  
However, the ongoing global pandemic has forced courts to suspend jury 
trials, both in federal and state courtrooms, for reasons other than that 
historical distinction. Today, one of the most recognized tools of American 
jurisprudence has become a main reason why regular court proceedings 
haven’t been able to resume. This is because putting together a jury requires 
bringing together strangers and confining them in close quarters to hear 
arguments over the course of hours, sometimes days. The early stages of jury 
selection requires bringing together hundreds of people who are simply 
answering their call to civic duty, yet the process in which they’re organized 
violates dozens of CDC guidelines.  
As an initial response, state and federal courts are currently finding new 
ways to call juries to hear cases. The new methods, however, are imperfect 
to say the least, and pose major constitutional problems if more intricately 
scrutinized. Taking a look at some of the issues confronting American courts 
in the upcoming months paints a picture of unprecedented times for litigants, 
both civil and criminal.  
 
A.  Issue  
 
The most obvious issue confronting the judicial system during the 
COVID-19 pandemic is the simple task of bringing together a jury. State and 
federal courts will need to address jurors’ concerns about protecting their 
health from the earliest stages of the process. While hearing a case, jurors 
should be focused only on hearing and weighing facts and evidence, not 
worrying about their risk for contracting the virus. To ensure the safety of 
jurors, courts will need to develop sanitation and social-distancing procedures 
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that minimize the potential for viral spread. In the meantime, however, many 
courts have begun using alternative methods for hearing cases, mainly 
through the use of virtual communication platforms that will be discussed in 
more detail below.  
Those non-face-to-face methods will pose other hurdles to litigants, 
mainly in the realm of Confrontation Clause issues. It is well established law 
that a criminal defendant has the right to confront witnesses testifying against 
them in court, but whether Zoom virtual conference calls satisfy that 
requirement will surely be a hotly debated topic in the coming months.  
Finally, when juries will be able to return to the courtroom is another 
question with unclear answers. Obviously, a wide variety of operational 
differences and varying levels of the coronavirus’s impact in different regions 
of the country will affect re-openings. Courts will need to balance the need 
to resume jury trials in their communities with their responsibility to ensure 
the safety of court personnel – jurors, court employees, and litigants alike.  
Unlike previous issues posed in this paper, there is an extremely limited 
amount of precedent for a total shutdown of jury trials. The methods being 
used to continue court proceedings virtually, though technologically superior 
to anything used in the past, create completely novel problems for the judicial 
system. The future is highly speculative, and any solutions will surely be 
criticized, modified, and litigated as COVID-19 continues to affect the 
nation. 
 
B.  When and How Courtrooms Return 
 
The COVID-19 Judicial Task Force recently published a report on the 
reimplementation of jury trials in federal courts across the country.109 In it, 
the task force, which is made up of federal trial judges, court executives, and 
representatives from the federal defender community and the Department of 
Justice, offers suggestions for courts to consider when restarting jury trials. 
Notably, the task force makes clear that when jury trials should continue will 
be entirely up to individual states, districts, and perhaps even divisions, based 
on the differing locations, stage of recovery, funding, and respective opinions 
on the appropriate steps necessary to ensure safety.110   
As for the how, the task force goes through the jury selection process and 
explains what steps should be taken throughout each phase of the timeline. 
First, individual courts should determine the level of personal protective 
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equipment (PPE) required by those entering the courthouse. Whether PPE 
will be provided to jurors, or if they need to bring their own, will be up to the 
individual jurisdictions. If jurors are required to bring their own PPE, 
however, courts should recognize the risk involved, including: “1) 
contaminated/un-sanitized PPE brought into the courthouse and courtroom; 
2) jurors failing or refusing to bring their own PPE; and 3) political statements 
or otherwise controversial or inciteful personalized masks.”111 
Next, the task force explains ways of communicating to jurors the steps 
the court is taking to ensure their safety. Surely, COVID-19 may empower 
some potential jurors to use the pandemic as an excuse to avoid jury duty 
altogether. Each of the 94 federal district courts maintains its own jury 
procedures and policies regarding excuses from jury service, and The Jury 
Act also allows courts to excuse a juror from service at the time he or she is 
summoned on the grounds of "undue hardship or extreme inconvenience."112 
The task force’s report attempts to offer courts suggestions on preventing the 
misuse of the juror hardship excuse. Even so, the report acknowledges that 
courts should “[p]lan for a lower yield from the jury pool during the 
pandemic. Even healthy jurors not considered particularly vulnerable to 
COVID-19 may hesitate to serve for a variety of reasons.113 
Finally, the report highlights important social distancing and sanitation 
practices for the actual jury selection and voir dire process. Main points 
include placing signage at courthouse entrances explaining the court’s 
response and reminding individuals to maintain proper social distancing, 
placing tape marks on floors for proper distancing, having free-standing hand 
sanitizer stations, and even bypassing the jury assembly area completely by 
bringing jurors directly into the courtroom to view orientation and the Chief 
Judge video.114  
The report also points towards the possibility of remote jury selection and 
the differences between the handling of civil and criminal matters. “Some 
courts might consider in civil cases, or in criminal cases with consent, virtual 
voir dire with prospective jurors participating from home via 
videoconferencing technology.”115 
All these suggestions, though helpful in preventing the spread of COVID-
19, pose a number of hurdles for litigators and court staff. One potential 
ramification of the variable timetable is the increase in forum shopping 
amongst litigants. It’s likely that civil plaintiff’s set on demanding a trial by 
jury will seek out those areas less affected by the COVID-19 pandemic when 
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possible. On a more basic level, masks may prevent effective voir dire as 
attorneys struggle to pick up on changes in emotion from jurors – smirks, 
giggles, clenched teeth, all patterns that may show bias or disinterest in the 
case. Perhaps the most critical issue has to do with maintaining a fair cross-
section of the community. Certain groups such as African-Americans, 
Latinos, and the elderly, have been disproportionately affected by the 
coronavirus. It’s possible that we see challenges based on these issues in the 
months to come.  
To dodge these issues, many courts have turned to experimenting with 
remote jury trials. Zoom, the leading teleconferencing service throughout this 
pandemic, has begun gaining traction in state and federal court proceedings. 
A Collin County court in Texas held the nation’s first Zoom jury trial on May 
18, 2020, where despite some technical issues, twenty-six potential jurors 
called in on devices such as laptops, iPhones, and tablets, to go through the 
jury selection process and ultimately hear a one-day civil proceeding with a 
non-binding verdict. The experiment has since been the inspiration for dozens 
of other similar proceedings.  
Florida’s Supreme Court, for example, recently called for a pilot program 
“to establish the framework and identify the logistics of trying cases 
remotely.”116 The pilot program is limited to civil cases and will be 
authorized in only up to five of the state’s 20 judicial circuits, but frankly, the 
added expense and effort of connecting with jurors remotely might make 
settling more attractive to plaintiffs. In a state where COVID-19 is having 
devastating effects, jury trials in civil cases may simply not be worth the risk. 
Criminal defendants, on the other hand, will surely continue to invoke 
their right to a jury trial. Although virtual court proceedings are beginning to 
make their way into criminal courts, mainly though preliminary appearances 
and arraignments, the challenges that prosecutors face with regards to jury 
trials are not as easily solved with Zoom teleconferences.  
 
C.  Confrontation Clause Problems 
 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees a “face-to-face encounter” between 
a defendant and his accusers in criminal matters.117 Justice Scalia, in writing 
the majority opinion for the Supreme Court in Coy v. Iowa, explained the 
rationale for this constitutional requirement: “[t]he perception that 
confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because 
there is much truth to it. A witness may feel quite differently when he has to 
repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting 
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or mistaking the facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that 
man is.”118 Notably, the Supreme Court commented on the literal 
interpretation of that “face-to-face” confrontation, describing it as 
“irreducible.”119 
In the concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor described how some 
situations might warrant an exception to that rule, explaining that when it was 
deemed necessary, certain case-specific trial procedures could help protect 
important public policy interests. The interest Justice O’Connor was referring 
to in Coy was the protection of a child witness testifying against their abuser. 
However, it’s possible that future litigants will argue the COVID-19 
pandemic may trigger the exception as courts seek to protect the important 
public interests of safety and prevention of further spread of the virus.  
Shortly after Coy, the Supreme Court revisited confrontation clause issues 
in Maryland v. Craig. Justice O’Connor’s “necessity” argument was 
referenced to permit the use of a one-way, closed-circuit television system, 
making it possible for a child witness to testify in a sexual assault case 
pursuant to a state statute allowing for such remote testimony.120 Despite the 
Supreme Court appearing to depart from the importance of maintaining face-
to-face confrontation, Craig actually doubled down on the significance of 
that requirement. The court stated that “[t]he combined effect of these 
elements of confrontation – physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and 
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact – serves the purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an accused 
is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of 
Anglo-American criminal proceedings.”121 
That section, highlighting that the “observation of demeanor by the trier 
of fact” serves an important part of confrontation clause analysis, is a key 
reason why Zoom trials should not find their way into the criminal court 
system. The simple fact is this – it is impossible to ensure that jurors will 
remain attentive when sitting on a jury from the comfort of their homes, 
workplaces, or anywhere other than the jury box. One could argue that there 
is no way of ensuring that attentiveness even from within the courtroom, but 
the differences are like night and day. Inside a courtroom, jurors get a sense 
of the significance of their role through the many environmental stimuli 
present around them. The silence in the courtroom as they enter their jury box 
speaks louder than anything they can experience from home. The presence of 
the bailiff, court reporter, and judge all paint a picture of the serious nature 
of proceedings. The wood benches, the attorneys navigating the well, and the 
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sound of the gavel as it strikes down all trigger feelings of importance in the 
courtroom. 
If virtual jury trials were to be allowed in criminal cases, all of those 
features of the standard courtroom would be lost. In its place would be the 
sound of the neighbor’s lawn mower, the racket of children playing in the 
room next door, and the temptation of a cell phone buzzing within a pocket. 
Judges can attempt with the best of intentions to limit these outside 
distractions, but their attempts simply won’t rise to the level they achieve 
when given under the curtain of an official courtroom setting.  
More than a decade after Coy and Craig, the Supreme Court revisited the 
importance of a defendant’s right to confront a witness in a face-to-face 
setting in Crawford v. Washington. The Court rejected any argument that the 
State can satisfy the Confrontation Clause by alternative procedures that 
produce “reliable” evidence.122 Although Zoom may offer jurors the ability 
to keep a watchful eye on defendants, witnesses, and attorneys alike, it simply 
doesn’t match the quality of an in-person courtroom proceeding – nor does it 
matter. Coy, Craig, and Crawford all establish that a defendant has a 
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses face-to-face in the courtroom with the jury present. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
The problems highlighted in this comment are intended to give litigators 
a sense of how the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will affect future courtroom 
proceedings. Despite many of the issues having some form of precedent – 
either through past court closures, relevant case law, or statutory text – the 
severity and intensity of this virus makes predicting the future a difficult task. 
As it stands, COVID-19 continues to affect previously enacted court orders, 
further exacerbating the problems associated with statutes of limitations, 
speedy trials, and jury trials.  
How these problems are dealt with is largely in the hands of the attorneys 
who face them in the upcoming months. They are the ones who will lay the 
groundwork for future generations of litigators who find themselves dealing 
with global pandemics, natural disasters, and other catastrophic events. 
Viruses like COVID-19 are always evolving, and they will continue to derail 
every-day life along with the systems developed during their lulls. However, 
the guidance established during this time will prove to be critical when the 
next group of litigators seeks answers for their problems.  
For now, those who deal with the statutory and constitutional hurdles 
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posed by COVID-19 should know that, despite the seemingly unprecedented 
nature of the virus, there are arguments to be made that are rooted in history. 
Zealous and effective advocates will use the tools they have been given to 
challenge the orders tolling limitations periods. Vigilant attorneys will 
understand the dangers of standing idly by as their clients await their day in 
court, especially if they face incarceration or are already incarcerated. Savvy 
litigators will weigh the pros and cons of demanding their client’s right to a 
jury trial, a decision with greater implications now than ever before. These 
issues are novel, yes, but they are not inexplicable.  
 It’s a challenging time to be a trial attorney in the United States. In 
addition to the difficulties of preparing coherent and effective arguments, trial 
attorneys are now tasked with being experts on a vast new range of issues 
stemming from this pandemic. Hopefully, this comment provides useful 
guidance as courts continue to reopen, and cases continue to be litigated.   
 
* * * 
 
 
